Military Air Tactics

After decades of increasingly rapid offensive maneuver, the Russo-Ukraine war is characterized by World War I-style attrition. The enemy can now detect the slightest movements and attack without notice, resulting in a battlefront locked into defensive strongholds with “soldiers buried in trenches, where even personnel rotations and medical evacuations have become perilous.” This is the result of three main developments. The first is small tactical drones, which are used to target military forces and equipment across air, land, and sea—and even fight other drones. The second is electronic warfare, which now encompasses tracing, jamming, and even taking over drone signals. It enabled an enemy to target back and eliminate specialized, difficult-to-replace crews. And the third is remote-controlled sensors of varying complexity. Generously deployed in contested but undefended “white spaces,” they create protective buffers preventing the enemy from sneaking through. https://lnkd.in/exVA6D7Z

⛴️🚁The recent transformation of commercial transport platforms—especially #containerships—into potential #vectors for #covert #strikes marks a chilling new threshold in global security. The fact that these #vessels can now be weaponized before they ever reach port, circumventing traditional inspection protocols, introduces an evolving threat: anyone, anywhere near key logistics routes—be it road, rail, or inland waterways—is now potentially within the blast radius of #asymmetrical #conflict. This is #TrojanHorse🎠2.0—a model of warfare where the delivery mechanism appears benign until it’s too late. Simultaneously, #Ukraine🇺🇦’s #FPV drone offensive has quietly rewritten the rules of engagement. In an operation over a year in the making, Ukrainian agents successfully infiltrated the vicinity of key #Russian #airbases and withdrew without loss or exposure, prior to any show trials or fabricated arrests. Despite formidable Russian #EW #defenses and strategic depth, Ukraine demonstrated tactical innovation: small FPV drones costing approximately $500 each were moved near high-value targets and launched in #coordinated #swarms. Control may have been enabled through #mobile #rerouter 🚚🚛#trucks using satellite 🛰️ uplinks or fiber-optic guidance, bypassing radio jamming. The drones penetrated layers of 📡 radar and air defenses, hitting strategic bombers like the Tu-22M3, Tu-95, Tu-160, and Beriev A-50—aircraft collectively worth billions of dollars. Conservative estimates place the financial damage between $2 billion and $7 billion, underscoring one of the most cost-effective operations in modern warfare. These long-range bombers had been launching standoff cruise missiles against Ukraine from deep within Russian territory, under the assumption they were untouchable. That assumption is now shattered. The operation not only diminished #Russia🇷🇺’s aerial strike capabilities, but also struck a psychological blow to the illusion of strategic sanctuary. The FPV drones, likely undetectable due to their size and numbers, overwhelmed defenses at close range. The implications extend beyond #Ukraine🇺🇦 and #Russia🇷🇺: any high-value asset not actively defended—even in its own home territory—is now vulnerable. This was not a Hollywood script—it was a real-world demonstration of 21st-century #asymmetric #warfare at its most innovative. The message is clear: with enough #creativity, #intelligence, and #determination, even #smallnations can cripple the assets of major powers: $500 drones neutralizing $300 million bombers is not just a tactical success—it’s a warning to militaries worldwide. In this new era, victory is not defined by scale, but by #imagination and courage.

Russian sources recently published 17 rules for fighting in modern combat conditions. Most of these are interchangeable with Western views but a departure from some Russian norms. Source: https://lnkd.in/ewjE3QTP 1. Air advantage: - Reconnaissance and surveillance (including using UAVs and satellites) -Strike capabilities (aviation and FPV drones) - Suppression of enemy air forces 2. Communication and command and control - Reliable, secure, and fast communication - Coordinate the actions of units in real-time - Combat control systems (automated systems) 3. Artillery and fire support - High-precision munitions - Effective fire adjustment - Rapid response and mobility of artillery assets 4. Personnel training - Psychological stability - Ability to adapt to rapidly changing conditions - Tactical and technical training 5. Electronic warfare (EW) and electronic intelligence (EI) - Suppression of enemy communications and command and control - Protection of one's own communications and navigation systems 6. Engineering support - Installation of minefields - Creation of defensive structures. -Organization and protection of river crossings 7. Logistics and support: - Uninterrupted supply of ammunition, fuel, and food - Mobile medical centers and evacuation of the wounded - Repair of equipment and provision of spare parts. 8. Camouflage and stealth - Use camouflage and thermal and radar shelters - Reducing the visibility of equipment and personnel (including the IR spectrum). 9. Quality and modernity of personnel weapons - High-tech individual equipment (sights, night vision devices, body armor). - Ergonomics and reliability of weapons. 10. Moral and psychological state of the troops: -High fighting spirit and motivation -High-quality work of political instructors, military psychologists, and commanders 11. Information and Intelligence -Precise intelligence (human, electronic, satellite) - Situational awareness of terrain, forces, and plans of the enemy. 12. Climatic and geographical factors - Taking into account weather conditions and terrain - Adapt tactics to the environment and terrain 13. Technological superiority - Automation and digitalization of processes - Artificial intelligence for data analysis and forecasting - Application of robotic systems and autonomous platforms 14. Speed and mobility - Ability to quickly maneuver and move forces - Organization of mobile units for operational response 15. Effective resource management - Rational use of ammunition and equipment - Accounting for time and resources for completing tasks 16. Information war - Demoralization of the enemy through media and psychological impact - Maintaining information superiority 17. Coordination with allies - Effective coordination of actions in multinational operations - Taking into account the characteristics and capabilities of allied forces

If you want to understand where the future fight is headed... This issue of Gray Space is must-read. A few things jumped out: ➤ 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨 𝐋𝐨𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐫 𝐎𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 The Army is tearing down stovepipes between cyber, EW, information ops, and kinetic operations. Col. Hosey’s message makes it clear; the “inner ring” mentality is dying, and the future belongs to integrated teams operating at the speed of threat. That applies just as much to industry as it does to the force. ➤ 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐒𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐦 𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐁𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐥𝐞𝐟𝐢𝐞𝐥𝐝 Every article reinforces this: China, Russia, and near-peer adversaries aren’t waiting for tomorrow. They’re shaping the fight through jamming, deception, AI-driven influence, and electromagnetic dominance today. If you can’t operate in a denied or degraded environment, you’re not ready. ➤ 𝐀𝐈 𝐢𝐬 𝐎𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐲 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭 Several authors show how AI is shaping targeting, decision-making, misinformation, and cyber operations. It’s not theoretical anymore; it's being used at scale, on both sides of the fight. ➤ 𝐄𝐖 𝐒𝐨𝐥𝐝𝐢𝐞𝐫𝐬 / 𝐂𝐲𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐎𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐬 𝐁𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐃𝐢𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐖𝐚𝐫 What impressed me most was the emphasis on hands-on realism, contested environments, and the expectation that junior leaders make decisions without perfect information. This is the same mindset small GovCon firms must adopt: speed, adaptability, and initiative win. ➤ 𝐈𝐧𝐧𝐨𝐯𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐢𝐬 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐆𝐫𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐝 𝐋𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐥 My favorite example was the low-cost, homegrown EW training solutions built in-house by the 10th Mountain Division. Emitters enabling realistic, multi-domain training (<$100 each)? That’s exactly the kind of bottom-up innovation that wins wars and something our federal ecosystem needs more of. If you support the DoW, DHS, IC, or any federal mission that touches cyber, spectrum, AI, training, sensors, or modernization… ...make the time to read this issue. It’s a powerful look into where the US Army is going. But more importantly, where the entire national security landscape is heading. Happy to share my notes or talk through the implications for small GovCon firms preparing for 2026 and beyond. The future fight won’t wait and neither should we. ___________________________________ 🔥 Join 27,297 others and subscribe to our GovCon newsletter | https://lnkd.in/es6qfwgk 👀 Follow me (Neil McDonnell) on LinkedIn™ and hit the 🔔 on my profile to see more government contracting content like 42,655 other people do.

NATO has seen the future of warfare through Ukrainian eyes. And it did not like what it saw. The Wall Street Journal recently published an article examining NATO exercises held in Estonia last May, involving 16,000 troops from 12 Allied nations. Ukrainian drone operators took part as well, some of whom arrived directly from the front lines. The exercise scenario simulated a high-intensity conflict on a “contested and congested” battlefield characterized by the mass employment of unmanned systems. In one phase, a team of approximately ten Ukrainians, acting as the opposing force, mock-destroyed 17 armored vehicles and conducted around 30 additional strikes within half a day. Another group, roughly 100 personnel strong, deployed more than 30 drones across an area of less than 10 square kilometers. Even then, the drone density was approximately half of what is currently observed on parts of the Ukrainian front. Exercise umpires reportedly compensated for this by counting some strikes as “double” to approximate real-world lethality. In effect, two battalions were rendered combat ineffective in a single day. For conventional NATO formations, the proliferation of drones presented not only a technical challenge but a conceptual one. Battle groups maneuvered and deployed in accordance with long-established procedures developed for environments defined by the “fog of war,” delayed detection, and the possibility of moving without being immediately observed. However, when such a concentration of unmanned systems operates overhead, the line of contact ceases to be a maneuver space and becomes an environment of persistent surveillance. Vehicles, tents, logistical columns, even individual platforms are rapidly detected. Any concentration of force can quickly become a target. Ukraine’s Delta battlefield management system enabled real-time integration of reconnaissance data, the generation of a shared operational picture, and the coordination of strikes with minimal procedural delay. Ukrainian units are accustomed to sharing large volumes of data rapidly across multiple levels of command. By contrast, Alliance structures often default to restricting access to sensitive information, formalizing approvals, and transmitting decisions vertically before acting. In a drone-saturated battlespace, such delays translate directly into loss of tempo and, ultimately, loss of assets. The exercise exposed a broader issue: significant portions of NATO doctrine, procedures, and even information-sharing culture are misaligned with the realities of contemporary warfare. One commander reportedly summarized the experience bluntly, in words quoted without embellishment in the article: “We are f—ed.” At least it was an exercise.

The recent strike on a Russian military node in the Black Sea marks more than just a tactical success — it highlights a fundamental shift in the architecture of modern warfare. The reported use of RBS-15 cruise missiles, combined with maritime and aerial drones, demonstrates how Ukraine is evolving toward a network-centric, multi-domain operational model. What makes this significant? This was not a single strike — it was a coordinated system-level attack: • unmanned systems (sea and air) created saturation and confusion • precision-guided missiles delivered decisive impact • electronic warfare and communication nodes were primary targets The destroyed offshore platform had effectively functioned as a forward surveillance and control hub, extending radar coverage, enabling communications, and supporting air defense systems. Its elimination creates a gap in situational awareness — a critical vulnerability in any defense system. Technology vs. Legacy Doctrine The use of RBS-15 is particularly notable due to: • low-altitude flight profiles (sea-skimming) • resistance to radar-based countermeasures • autonomous targeting capabilities But the key takeaway is not the missile itself — it’s the integration. Ukraine is increasingly applying a model where: low-cost drones overload defenses → precision systems strike critical nodes This approach challenges traditional layered air defense systems, which were designed for predictable, limited threats, not distributed swarms + precision strike combinations. Strategic Implications 1. Degradation of air defense effectiveness Overloaded systems struggle to prioritize targets in real time. 2. Expansion of operational reach Even limited numbers of long-range precision weapons introduce uncertainty across wide geographies. 3. Shift from platform-centric to system-centric warfare Success is no longer defined by individual weapons, but by how well systems interact. A Broader Pattern This reflects a larger transformation: • integration of commercial and military technologies (e.g., satellite communications) • rapid iteration and adaptation cycles • decentralized decision-making supported by digital infrastructure In contrast, legacy approaches relying on massed firepower and rigid command structures are increasingly inefficient against adaptive, networked systems. Modern warfare is no longer about volume — it is about systems, integration, and decision speed. The strike illustrates how targeting critical nodes (“eyes and nerves” of a system) can unlock cascading effects across an entire operational theater. Ukraine is not just defending territory — it is actively shaping a new model of warfare, one that will likely influence military thinking far beyond this conflict.

The REPMUS/Dynamic Messenger 2025 naval exercise, held off the coast of Portugal, revealed a profound shift in modern maritime warfare. Ukraine’s participation — a country with virtually no traditional navy — stood out by using naval drones and autonomous systems to face a NATO force composed of ships from the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, and other allies. Acting as the “Red Team,” Ukraine deployed more than 100 unmanned platforms, including surface, subsurface, and aerial drones, coordinated through the DELTA command system. The result was surprising: it won all five simulated scenarios. During the exercise, one ship was considered “sunk,” several others suffered severe damage, and in some cases, crews were not even aware they had been hit. This exposed critical gaps in NATO’s detection and response capabilities, particularly against small, hard-to-detect drones. The exercise highlighted major shortcomings: • Difficulty detecting low-signature drones • Lack of effective close-in defense systems • Insufficient electronic warfare adapted to drone swarms • Limitations in C2 (Command and Control) systems It became clear there is an urgent need for: • Layered defenses (hard-kill and soft-kill) • Use of lasers and electronic countermeasures • Integration of defensive drones • C2 modernization with faster, more connected systems The impact of drones goes beyond exercises. They are already influencing real-world operations: • U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf has been reduced due to the risk posed by Iranian drones • Aircraft carriers avoid certain ports due to vulnerability • Operations in the Red Sea have shown difficulties in dealing with drone attacks • The risk to commercial routes, such as the Strait of Hormuz, has increased significantly Drones have become a powerful asymmetric threat, capable of limiting action. This shows that military power no longer depends solely on large platforms such as ships or aircraft, but on the ability to operate networked autonomous systems. Countries such as Taiwan are already investing heavily in drones for defense against potential invasions. Cooperation between the United Kingdom and Ukraine on drones and artificial intelligence also points the way forward. Drones represent a decisive tactical advantage that has not yet been fully countered. NATO now faces the challenge of adapting to this new reality, where technological superiority depends less on the size of forces and more on the ability to innovate. The first lesson seems simple: whoever masters drones will dominate the modern battlefield.

The US Navy released its new Fighting Instructions today. They are not doctrine, nor a single operational concept, but a clear statement from the Chief of Naval Operations on how the Navy intends to generate readiness, manage risk, and fight in a far more contested maritime environment. What stands out is not ambition, but emphasis. First, the document recentres sea control and sea denial as the foundation of deterrence, prosperity and joint warfighting. This is a reminder that maritime power is not abstract. It is what underwrites freedom of manoeuvre, alliance credibility and economic security. Second, the Instructions are notably candid about readiness. Delayed maintenance, fragile shore infrastructure, munitions shortfalls and contested logistics are identified as the principal constraints on combat power today. The implicit message is straightforward: forces that cannot be sustained in peacetime will not be sustained in conflict. Third, the Navy is moving deliberately toward a hedge strategy. A ready main battle force is complemented by tailored offsets: autonomous systems, AI-enabled decision support, directed energy and lower-cost capabilities designed to manage risk against peer competitors, rather than attempting to make every platform do everything. For Australia, the relevance is clear. ◼️ Readiness and sustainment deserve as much attention as platforms. ◼️ There are opportunities for Australia to contribute meaningfully through tailored capabilities and industrial support. ◼️ And effective mission command cannot be assumed; it must be designed into force structure, command arrangements and culture well before crisis. This is a serious document. It reflects a navy focused less on presence and more on the practical requirements of deterrence and warfighting in the decade ahead. You can read it here 🔗 https://lnkd.in/gbBJtDnC

🎯 Rotation Denial and Sensor Dominance Along the Line of Contact   The attached footage demonstrates UAV operations conducted simultaneously across various groupings along the line of contact. It is important to note that the focus here is not on individual strikes, but rather on the range of sensors, targets, and roles functioning within the same battlespace.   🔍 What the Video Actually Shows   🚗 Target Profile The majority of strikes target soft-skinned vehicles, civilian cars, and lightly modified platforms with add-on protection. There is a notable absence of standard armored personnel carriers (APCs), infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), or protected motorized vehicles (such as MRAP-class platforms). This trend suggests that survivability is now influenced less by the type of platform and more by whether movement is detected at all.   🌡️ Multi-Spectral Detection Targets are identified and struck using both RGB optics and thermal imaging, which significantly reduces options for concealment and minimizes the survivability gap between day and night operations.   🛰️ Layered UAV Roles - Strike drones engaging ground targets. - Counter-UAV drones intercepting other drones in an air-dominance role. - High-resolution reconnaissance UAVs providing long-range detection and target cueing.   These roles are not separate missions; they function as a continuous sensor-shooter loop.   🚶 Movement as the Trigger Most engagements happen during rotations, resupply operations, or repositioning, rather than during deliberate assaults. Units are targeted because their movement is detected, not necessarily because they are actively attacking.   📌 Operational Takeaway Attrition is no longer primarily caused by assaults on prepared positions; it increasingly results from attempts to move forces under constant aerial observation. Low-altitude airspace has become permanently contested. UAVs serve simultaneously as sensors, shooters, and targets, while higher-end reconnaissance platforms extend detection capabilities beyond visual range.   In this environment, the decisive factor is no longer the thickness of armor or the category of the vehicle; it is the exposure time within a saturated sensor-shooter system. This represents a shift from traditional strike warfare to a focus on area control through persistent detection.   #MilitaryAnalysis #DroneWarfare #UAV #ModernWarfare #OperationalArt #BattlefieldDynamics #DefenseAnalysis