Yesterday at Flame-conference in Amsterdam, I spoke about Russian gas, Europe, and the wider mutation of the gas system. My main point was simple: after several decades of relative peace, growth, and deepening interdependence, we are moving into a period of fragmentation, confrontation, and growing militarisation. Gas is changing with it. The old idea of a global, liquid, competitive gas market is not disappearing physically - it is being filtered politically. We now see blocs, alignments, and exceptions: China taking sanctioned Russian LNG while avoiding US LNG under tariff pressure, Pakistan negotiating separate safe-passage arrangements for LNG tankers through Hormuz, and Europe learning that supply security is no longer only about molecules, but about corridors, shipping, insurance, and timing. Under these conditions, gas systems begin to mutate. They move away from the logic of a normal traded commodity and back toward the logic of state-supervised critical infrastructure. That shift carries a real danger. Under stress, administrative intervention becomes extremely attractive. Price regulation, state management, rationing, mandatory procurement, emergency controls - all can be justified in the name of security. Some state systems can do this effectively. China can, because it has the strategic discipline, speed, and administrative coherence to impose difficult decisions quickly. Europe does not operate that way, and cannot pretend otherwise. This is why the current moment is so important for the European gas industry. Four years after 2022, Russian gas is no longer the backbone of Europe’s system. But the deeper lesson is not about Russia alone. Europe reduced supplier dependence, yet increased system complexity. It moved from pipeline dependence to logistical dependence. That means the real question is no longer whether Europe can secure enough gas for the next winter. It is whether Europe can keep a gas system that is investible, competitive, flexible, and strategically resilient, without suffocating it under the very regulatory reflexes triggered by insecurity. Markets have many failures. But they can adapt. If the European gas industry can reinvent creative risk management, coordination, and investment logic under these new conditions - as it once did with the Groningen formula - it will remain part of the solution. If not, it risks might be slowly replaced by administrative control. Structural takeaway: the gas market is becoming more global physically, but less global politically. The real challenge for Europe is to build resilience without overregulating the market system it still needs. Tim Boersma Anne-Sophie Corbeau Erik Rakhou Geoffroy Hureau
I am still waiting to hear the importance of long term contracted new gas origination via existing secure pipeline sytems by enpowering them with new sources like Southern Gas Corridor and multiple suppliers namely Turkmen, Uzbek, Kazakh gas via Caspian sub sea PL (short version 77 km and up to 15 bcm most). Gas price volatility can only be balanced with trustable and mıştiple alternative pipelines. Gulf countries may think about new pipelines for security reasons as well
Very interesting Tatiana Mitrova. But where does the divide sit between ‘building resilience’ and ‘over-regulation’? For example, would a centrally managed EU strategic gas reserve build resilience or over-regulation?
Tatiana Mitrova loved your speech as a moderator - it was spot on …
Excellent analysis! Fully agree
The real question is no longer whether Europe can secure enough gas for the next winter. It is whether Europe can keep a gas system that is investible, competitive, flexible, and strategically resilient, without suffocating it under the very regulatory reflexes triggered by insecurity.
Tatiana Mitrova your note is to the point. Sadly europe has become a bystander paying for conflict instigated by other international powers. We are witnessing a period where international rules are put into the bin. A set of international rules is replaced by the power games of the mighty powers prevailing over the less mighty powers. The countries organised under the EU roof, but indeed everyone else on the 🌍 is left to „pay the bill“ resulting from power games. For stakeholders in Moldova none of this is new, therefor your words come with experience!
The real variable now isn’t supply volumes but risk architecture. How Europe allocates geopolitical logistical, and regulatory risk will determine whether capital stays market based or shifts toward quasi administrative models .
and thanks Tatiana for your all good points ..
Thank you for sharing your insights dear Tatiana. As you correctly point out, ditching Russian gas was entirely based on political considerations, but it seems that so far Europeans only changed its supply source, as they now grow heavily dependent on U.S. LNG cargoes. Do you see Europe breaking free from its gas dependence at all in any way or resorting back to promote its own domestic sources? Green hydrogen, as important as it might be, now is a pie-in-the-sky right now and renewables alone can't offset the gas demand. Interested in reading your insights, thank you.