Military Aviation Operations

29 August 2024: Key takeaways from this evening's Ukraine Update by the great team at the Institute for the Study of War: - Russian forces are currently pursuing two immediate tactical efforts as part of their ongoing offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk, in Donetsk Province — a tactical effort along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line east of Pokrovsk to seize Myrnohrad and advance up to Pokrovsk's outskirts, and another tactical effort along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction and eliminating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks. - The Russian military command likely aims to achieve both of these tactical efforts before launching the more resource-intensive effort to seize Pokrovsk itself, although Russian forces may begin urban combat in Pokrovsk regardless, if progress stalls on these preparatory efforts. - Russian authorities are creating new volunteer territorial defense units in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, highlighting Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to counter the incursion more seriously with a mobilization due to the risks of societal discontent or with large-scale redeployments due to possible disruptions to Russia's ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. - Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced north of Sudzha as Russian forces recaptured some areas of Kursk Oblast on August 29. - The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet recently crashed while defending against a large-scale Russian drone and missile strike. - Russian authorities arrested and charged former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Pavel Popov with large-scale fraud on August 29. - Russian President Vladimir Putin will conduct an official visit to Mongolia despite Mongolia's status as a signatory to the Rome Statue and Mongolia’s legal obligation to enforce an arrest warrant for Putin from the International Criminal Court (ICC). - The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 29 that Ukrainian forces struck the Atlas Oil Refinery in Rostov Oblast and the Zenit Oil Depot in Kirov Oblast on the night of August 27 to 28. - Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City. - The Russian government continues to expand pathways for accused criminals to sign military service contracts. #ukrainewar #linkedintopvoices

FY2026 Signals Joint Defense Tech The Pentagon isn’t looking for more tech. It’s looking for tech that fits the fight. What wins? interoperable, multi-domain, coalition-ready tech that aligns with how the U.S. and its allies will fight. Hear me out… 1. Integration Is the Mission PE 0604826J is the COG for CJADC2. It funds interoperability pilots with NATO, secure data sharing across services, and cross-domain C2 experiments like Bold Quest. Your tech needs to plug into this joint ecosystem. 2. Multi-Domain C2 Is Non-Negotiable The budget holds firm on digital datalinks, secure comms, and allied data exchange. Your tech must talk across domains and allies, don’t expect traction. 3. Rapid Prototyping Isn’t Dead—It’s Evolving RDER may be gone, but its intent lives on. The budget still backs prototypes that can shape joint force design. Demo utility in a joint context and watch your TRL skyrocket. 4. Congress ‘All In on Joint Tech’ is a buying signal. • $400M → Joint Fires Network • $400M → Joint battle management tools • $1B → Accelerated tech fielding • $2B → DIU scaling commercial tech 5. AI/ML, Autonomy, C5ISR—Joint prioritization isn’t just lip service. Budget lines explicitly call out: • Multi-service unmanned systems • Maritime robotics • Coalition-ready EW and ISR

Check out the new Space Systems Command published Command Plan! 🚀 “Space Systems Command is the USSF field command that develops and delivers dominant, integrated, and resilient space warfighting capabilities, protecting our Nation’s strategic advantage in, from, and to space. SSC is responsible for delivering these military space capabilities and functions: •Satellite Communications •Orbital Warfare •Navigation Warfare •Electromagnetic Warfare •Missile Warning and Tracking •Cyberspace Warfare •Space-Based Sensing and Targeting •Command and Control •Space Lift •Battle Management •Launch Range Control •Space Intelligence •Space Domain Awareness •Networks •Operational Test and Training Infrastructure SSC plans and delivers these military space capabilities and functions from 29 locations in the U.S. and around the globe. •SSC is headquartered at Los Angeles Air Force Base, where many of the Command’s military space capabilities are planned and managed. SSC’s Space Base Delta 3 operates Los Angeles Air Force Base. •Vandenberg Space Force Base and Patrick Space Force Base / Cape Canaveral Space Force Station serve as our Nation’s spaceports. Vandenberg and Patrick/Cape are managed by SSC Launch Delta 30 and SSC Launch Delta 45, respectively. Our mission is to develop and field dominant space capabilities. Our military, our Nation, and our allies rely on us to deliver the space capabilities that protect our Nation, enable our critical infrastructures, and fuel our economy. Military space capabilities do not deliver themselves; they’re only as good as the warfighters that deliver them. We will outpace the threat now and into the future by advancing our SSC warfighters. Our vision is freedom for the United States, its allies, partners, and all responsible spacefaring entities to enjoy the benefits of a stable and secure space domain. However, other nations are aggressively developing capabilities that threaten the stability of the space domain and its freedom for future generations. Maintaining space superiority requires the provision and protection of space capabilities to deter and, if necessary, prevail in conflict. Every link in the kill chain depends upon SSC accomplishing our mission so that when linked with all of the Nation’s elements of power, our vision may be realized.”

In recent months, Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resilience and innovation in its maritime strategy, achieving significant victories at sea. The article “Ukraine’s Victory at Sea: How Kyiv Subdued the Russian Fleet – and What It Will Need to Build on Naval Success” highlights how Ukraine has effectively used several key strategies to challenge and counter Russian naval operations, including: - Integration of Drones: Deploying maritime drones for reconnaissance and precision strikes against Russian naval targets. - Use of Cruise Missiles: Employing advanced cruise missiles to disrupt and damage key Russian naval assets from a distance. - Naval Mine Warfare: Utilizing naval mines to block and inflict damage on Russian vessels, restricting their operational capabilities. - Adaptation of Commercial Vessels: Converting commercial vessels into armed platforms to extend Ukraine’s operational reach. - Enhanced Intelligence Sharing: Leveraging improved intelligence and surveillance for effective targeting and planning. These strategies demonstrate a highly adaptive approach to modern naval warfare. By leveraging advanced technologies and repurposing existing assets, Ukraine has gained critical maritime advantages, showcasing how innovation and adaptability can shift the balance in asymmetric conflicts and achieve strategic objectives.

Ukraine’s success against the Russian navy is making the Pentagon nervous – and rightfully so. The US Navy is now actively training to counter the threat posed by autonomous, explosive-laden drone boats. During Baltic Operations 2025, Task Force 66 used uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) to simulate swarm-style attacks on ships like the USS Mount Whitney and USS Paul Ignatius. This training is a direct response to what Ukraine has pulled off against Russia since the start of the invasion. In the Black Sea, Ukraine’s drones have sunk dozens of Russian vessels, forcing Moscow to relocate its fleet to safer harbors. Fast, cheap, and lethal, these USVs have rendered legacy naval thinking obsolete almost overnight. The US military has been aware of this threat since the infamous Millennium Challenge 2002 wargame more than two decades ago, but here’s what planners are recognizing now: - Conventional defenses like manned gun stations and missiles struggle against agile, low-profile drones - Awareness must extend below radar to give service members enough time to detect and engage fast-moving threats - There’s no silver bullet: it will take a combination of sensors, kinetic weapons, and autonomy to effectively meet this moment Luckily, our Navy is leading the way. Task Force 66, formed last year, is integrating robotic systems into fleet operations and developing tactics for maritime theaters where speed, flexibility, and autonomy matter most. If aircraft carriers and destroyers remain the Navy’s most valuable naval assets, then they must also be protected with dynamic, intelligent counter-drone systems. The maritime battlefield is evolving – we need solutions that evolve with it.

Command Without Control: Is NATO’s New Vision the Future of C2? 🛡️🌐 NATO’s Cross-Domain Command (CDC) concept (May 2025) challenges the very foundation of military leadership. The core provocation? In a multi-domain world, you must be able to command what you cannot control. This marks a shift from a rigid hierarchy to a model more like civilian strategic leadership: placing a premium on the ability to align, influence, and mobilise a diverse network of actors over whom you have no formal authority. The Shift: ❶ From Hierarchy to Network: Traditional hierarchies will, to a wide extent, be replaced by fluid, episodic structures focused on Unity of Effort (as opposed to unity of command). ❷ Radical Mission Command: Leaders must mobilise diverse actors, from cyber experts to civilian partners, without formal authority. A revitalised form of mission command. ❸ Agile Targeting: Planning must move at the speed of relevance, integrating effects across all domains simultaneously.  Theory vs. Reality: We already see elements of this in Ukraine, in total defence approaches with multiple state actors, at the higher military command levels, and in complex UN missions. The future is already here. The Challenge: The main challenge is cultural, not technological. The CDC demands a total rethink of our leadership mindset. How can we command in an environment where authority is fluid and agility is our primary currency? 💡 Our Research: As part of our project on contemporary command, Anne and I have prepared a teaching note to help think through this shift in Multi-Domain Operations C2. Our interview data offer ideas to overcome this challenge. And perhaps the rigid, vertical hierarchy, especially at the highest levels or in multinational operations, was always more of a fantasy than a reality. 👉 Read our teaching note here:  https://lnkd.in/etFh5ha4

Autonomous & Unmanned Systems in Multi-Domain Operations: From Tools to Integrated Capabilities Autonomous and unmanned systems (UxS) are no longer “future concepts.” They are shaping today’s battlespaces, supporting civilian resilience, and redefining how we secure critical infrastructure. But their impact is not limited to hardware. For UxS to truly enhance Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), we must address people, processes, culture, and mindset: 🔹 Process – UxS change the tempo of operations. They demand modular, scalable digital backbones that enable secure interoperability and real-time integration across air, land, sea, cyber, and space. 🔹 People – Operators must move from system-by-system management to orchestrating missions across swarms, sensors, and data streams. Skills in autonomy, AI, and data fusion are just as critical as piloting. 🔹 Culture & Mindset – Delegation is central. Trusting autonomy means shifting from micromanagement to mission command supported by AI-enabled decision loops (OODA). Leaders must embrace this digital culture. 🔹 Ethics & Governance – UxS and AI must be reliable, secure, ethical, and human-centred. Adoption is not just about what technology can do, but what societies, militaries, and laws are prepared to accept. The role of UxS extends beyond defence: ⚡ Protecting critical infrastructure – ports, energy grids, undersea cables. ⚡ Enhancing disaster response – evacuation, search & rescue, logistics. ⚡ Strengthening national security resilience – ISR, EW, and hybrid threat countermeasures. What we’ve seen in Ukraine is clear: autonomy evolves weekly, not in decades. Yet our defence cycles are still built for long-lifecycle platforms. To close this gap, we need: ✅ End-to-end integration — not just standalone systems, but capabilities embedded into missions. ✅ Cross-domain sensor fusion and secure digital backbones to connect operators, commanders, and assets. ✅ Collaboration across nations, industry, academia, and end-users to accelerate adoption. At Solita, this is where we focus: connecting the dots from design and governance, to secure AI, to digital backbones and real-time mission integration. Our role is to make autonomy not just smarter but operational, trusted, and truly multi-domain. If information was once power, today sharing and acting on information is power. And autonomous systems when integrated correctly are the multiplier.

The Strategic Defence Review has been published. The space domain is recognised as “a critical national infrastructure sector, a site of growing competition, and a domain that is central to warfighting.” Some key space recommendations: 🛰️ MOD should invest in the resilience of military space systems, with a focus on space control, decision advantage, and capabilities that support ‘Understand’ and ‘Strike’ functions. 🛰️ Space should be a priority technology portfolio for the new National Armaments Director, creating closer links across the military, civil, and industrial space complex. 🛰️ A reinvigorated Cabinet sub-Committee - or equivalent ministerial group - should set the UK’s strategic approach to space to maximise policy, operational, and capability synergies between the UK civil space sector and military needs. 🛰️ MoD should periodically review the SKYNET 6A and SKYNET 6EC satellite communications programmes to ensure this capability will be resilient and operationally relevant upon entry into service. 🛰️ MoD should seek partners to develop a next-generation, overhead, persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability to support Integrated Air and Missile Defence in the Euro-Atlantic 🛰️ Defence and DSIT should work together to ensure Defence requirements are reflected in cross-government efforts to deliver resilient space-based PNT systems Also, well done to the UK Space Agency's Anu Ojha and MDA Space's Anita Bernie who contributed their space expertise to the Review and Challenge phase of the Strategic Defence Review. https://lnkd.in/e3_6vsYp

Ukraine just used a $100K underwater drone to strike a $300M Russian submarine in port. This is asymmetric naval warfare; small, autonomous, distributed systems versus large platforms. Ukraine has little naval fleet left. Russia operates the Black Sea Fleet with submarines, destroyers, and cruisers. Yet Ukraine was able to hit Russia in Novorossiysk, a port that was considered safe. This is what the Hedge Strategy looks like in combat. Force multiplication through autonomous systems you can afford to lose, threatening platforms the enemy can't.

Months after Operation Sindoor against Pakistan, the Ministry of Defence has, for the first time, announced a major push towards deploying drones and outer space technologies for surveillance, military communication and identification of enemy targets. The plan envisages the acquisition of a couple of thousand drones, many of which would go beyond surveillance roles to carry out missile strikes. Outer space, meanwhile, is to be used primarily for surveillance and secure communication. The MoD has released the Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) and uploaded the document on its website, describing it as a programme for the next 15 years, till 2040. This is the third iteration of the TPCR, following earlier versions in 2013 and 2018.At the top of the list is a stratospheric airship capable of relaying communication and picking up signals emitted by enemy aircraft and missiles. The airship is expected to operate at an altitude of 35 km and use artificial intelligence to provide precise information on enemy targets. Another key space-based system envisaged is a ‘multi-band space-based sensor’ capable of detecting enemy radio waves. The MoD has also outlined plans for a solar-powered high-altitude pseudo satellite system designed to collect enemy communication data. It would be required to have an endurance of at least two months while loitering at 60,000 ft. Among drones, the services have projected a requirement for systems that can fly up to 1,500 km and operate at 60,000 ft, with stealth features to evade enemy radars. These drones are expected to carry specialised payloads, including communication interception devices, jamming systems and the capability to direct artillery fire on enemy positions. Some 360 of these ‘high-altitude long endurance’ drones are projected for acquisition, with numbers to be divided equally among the Army, Navy and the IAF The Navy is seeking drones that can takeoff and land vertically from ship decks, carry multiple payloads, operate up to 40,000 ft and have an endurance of 25 hours. Another projected requirement is drones with a range of 200 km and capacity to fly at 20,000 ft. The Army, meanwhile, has projected the need for 700-800 drones for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to enable precision targeting by ground weapons. It also requires UAVs that can loiter, carry a warhead and, when commanded, carry out kamikaze strikes on designated targets. The Tribune link to full text 👇 https://lnkd.in/gNBTtY9W