Securing Supply Chains for Critical Minerals

CAN THE SEAFLOOR SET US FREE? Building U.S. Independence in Rare Earths and Strategic Metals. For too long, the U.S. has relied on fragile supply chains dominated by China for rare earth elements (REEs)—critical inputs for everything from fighter jets to EV batteries. That’s a strategic vulnerability we can no longer afford. Here’s how we fix it: 1. Invest at Home: The Mountain Pass Rare Earth Mine and Processing Facility, is an open-pit mine of rare-earth elements on Clark Mountain Range in California. In 2020 the mine supplied 15.8% of the world's rare-earth production. However, we must build domestic refining and separation capacity—not just dig, but finish the job. 2. Expand U.S. Resource Base: The U.S. holds untapped rare earth potential across several novel sources: coal ash and acid mine drainage in Appalachia offer access to heavy REEs; phosphorite deposits in Florida, Idaho, and North Carolina yield light REEs as fertilizer byproducts; Bokan Mountain in Alaska and Bear Lodge in Wyoming provide hard rock and clay-hosted REE deposits. With the right tech and investment, these resources could power a domestic and resilient REE supply chain. 3. Deepen Ally Partnerships: Australia, Japan, and Canada are investing in non-Chinese REE chains. The U.S. should double down on these partnerships to build a resilient, democratic mineral alliance. 4. Fund Breakthrough Tech: This includes bioleaching with engineered microbes, membrane-based separations that replace toxic solvents, and AI-driven process optimization to boost efficiency from unconventional sources like coal ash and phosphates. Pairing these with pilot plants near key resource sites will prove viability and scale fast. 5. Look Beyond REEs—Secure the Entire Supply Chain: Polymetallic nodules on the seafloor of the Clarion-Clipperton Zone won’t solve REE supplies, but offer staggering quantities of nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese—all essential for electric vehicles, batteries, and the grid. No digging. No blasting. Just pure potential. And if you’re looking for heavy rare earth elements (HREEs)—the kinds needed for advanced missile systems, lasers, and wind turbines—look to the seafloor muds near Minamitorishima Island in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone. These deep-sea sediments contain some of the richest known concentrations of HREEs on Earth, including yttrium, terbium, dysprosium, and europium—all with strong potential for scalable extraction. Japan is already investing in this frontier, and the U.S. should be leaning in as a strategic partner to help turn this promise into production. The future is built from the ground up—or in this case, from the ocean floor up. Let’s secure it. #RareEarths #CriticalMinerals #CleanEnergy #SupplyChainSecurity #DeepSeaMining #PolymetallicNodules #Geopolitics #MineralIndependence #BatteryMetals #NationalSecurity #InnovationEconomy

CRITICAL MINERALS & DEFENDING THE U.S. - These Materials Could Cripple America’s Defense Industrial Base - A Practical Test for Material Chokepoints - Not every “critical” material is an urgent problem. A material chokepoint exists when five conditions coincide: high concentration in mining or refining, direct defense criticality, low substitutability without performance loss, long, capital-intensive build times, and recent signs of policy leverage such as export licenses, price manipulation, quotas, or prohibitions. - How vital is each material to U.S. defense, and how much leverage does China wield? - GRAPH: Figure 1. This chokepoint matrix flags where a shortfall would ripple through U.S. defense programs the fastest and where the weaponization of supply chains by an adversary would cause major disruptions. It synthesizes public sources (i.e., U.S. Geological Society, International Energy Agency, and export-control reports). Axes are ordinal 0-12 and convey relative differences (not metric). - First-tier risks are gallium, the battery-chemicals chain, tungsten, and graphite. A second tier includes titanium sponge, germanium, antimony, indium, magnesium, and molybdenum, with nitrocellulose and finish-line capacity in specialty steels and aerospace aluminum requiring near-term hedges because surge capacity is slow to add. - NOTE: Crucially, most chokepoints rarely happen at the actual mine. Most problems occur in mid- and downstream steps such as refining, separation, smelting, high-purity processing, alloying, component manufacture, and device-grade finishing. Ore alone does not deliver security. Rather, mid- and downstream control does. - Two pathways close gaps. 1. First, build at home - where chemistry, processing and finishing are the binding constraints rather than geology. This includes materials such as lithium-ion battery chemistry, coated and synthetic graphite anodes, nitrocellulose for propellants, semiconductor wafer and epitaxy capacity, infrared-optics finishing cells, tungsten-carbide recycling, and the finishing lines for specialty steels and aerospace aluminum. - Expanding these capabilities at home reduces exposure to Chinese leverage, grows the U.S. industrial base, and ensures that the finishing steps most critical to defense remain under American control. 2. Second, hedge upstream exposures with allies where ore, smelting, or primary refining are concentrated abroad. - Examples include structured offtake and investment, "U.S. recycling," and interim tolling until U.S. lines qualify. - For each material, align remedy to the chokepoint: If it is chemistry or device-grade finishing, build U.S. lines with price floors and multiyear offtake. If it is about upstream and feed gaps, use allied offtake and tolling as U.S. finishing ramps. When policy leverage appears, apply the playbook. - https://lnkd.in/dr8hgACm

India's Critical Mineral Paradox: Sitting on a Goldmine While Importing at Premium Prices I’ve spent time building businesses across consumer tech, telecom, and industrial sectors. Reading Alkesh Kumar Sharma’s strategic analysis on critical minerals was a wake-up call: India is racing toward clean energy leadership while dangerously dependent on imports for the very minerals that make it possible. Here’s the link: https://lnkd.in/dpjKHMsb This isn't just policy. It's national security and controlling our destiny in the 21st century economy. The vulnerability: India is 100% dependent on imports for lithium, cobalt, and nickel, over 90% for Rare Earth Elements. China controls 60% of global REE production and 85% of processing. We're targeting 500 GW renewable energy and net zero by 2070, while handing veto power over our clean energy future to geopolitical competitors. Having run P&Ls across markets, I know 100% import dependence isn't a supply chain. It's a strategic chokepoint. But India is sitting on untapped wealth. Geological Survey identified 5.9 million tonnes of lithium in J&K, significant REE deposits in Odisha and Andhra Pradesh. Yet mining contributes just 2.5% to GDP versus 13.6% in Australia. We have only 1% of global REE processing capacity. The government launched the National Critical Minerals Mission with ₹34,300 crore and auctioned 20 mineral blocks. The 2023 Mines Act opened private exploration. But execution determines everything. The urban goldmine: India generates 4 million tonnes of e-waste annually, only 10% formally recycled. Inside? The same minerals we're importing at massive cost. Attero proves what's possible. This Noida-based deeptech company achieves over 98% extraction efficiency in recovering rare earths like neodymium, praseodymium, and dysprosium, the exact elements we currently import. With over 200 patents filed and strong profitability, Attero’s revenue crossed approximately ₹1,000 crore in FY25, growing more than 50% year-on-year. The company works with all leading auto and battery manufacturers and is now expanding capacity sixfold to process 3 lakh tonnes annually, backed by significant capital infusion across India, Poland, and the US. India banned black mass exports, powder from shredded batteries we exported as cheap scrap to China, Korea, Japan who sold it back at 15-20x the price. This ban forces domestic refining. Attero proves we have the technology. The window is closing. If we don't build resilient supply chains through domestic mining, processing, and recycling, we're building our clean energy future on someone else's foundation. We have deposits, waste streams, and companies like Attero proving Indian technology competes globally. What we need is execution speed. #CriticalMinerals #CleanEnergy #AtmanirbharBharat #Sustainability #India

Many of my connections come from oil & gas, energy, and industrial sectors—industries that understand the complexities of supply chains and market dynamics. However, I believe the critical minerals industry has done itself a disservice by not clearly explaining why scaling U.S. supply chains isn’t as simple as ‘fixing permitting’ (though that remains essential). A recent Wall Street Journal article (https://lnkd.in/gwrJkp93) does an excellent job of outlining how China dominates the rare earth supply chain. But I wanted to take a deeper look—why is this problem so hard to fix, and what can actually be done about it? 📌 The Reality: Mining alone won’t solve the problem. The U.S. is creating orphan projects—mines that either can’t secure financing or get built only to remain dependent on Chinese processing and opaque pricing. 📌 The Economics: China’s monopoly isn’t just about supply—it’s about market control. With subsidized operations, opaque pricing, and the ability to undercut competitors, China has locked in its dominance. 📌 The Missing Piece: Even if the U.S. builds processing facilities, who buys the materials? Without binding offtake agreements, these plants risk being economically unviable. 📌 The Solution: We don’t just need mining. We need demand-side policy, price floors, strategic partnerships, and domestic downstream industries to create a market outside of China’s grip. I break all of this down in my latest article, linked below. This isn’t just about rare earths—it’s about all critical minerals. The same dynamics apply to lithium, nickel, graphite, and beyond. If we’re serious about securing these supply chains, we need to think beyond extraction. Would love to hear thoughts from those in oil & gas, mining, manufacturing, and policy—how do we break this cycle? #RareEarths #CriticalMinerals #EnergySecurity #Mining #SupplyChain #Manufacturing #Policy #IndustrialStrategy

Today’s announcement from MP Materials may be the strongest signal yet that the answer is: No. In a landmark move, MP Materials and the U.S. Department of Defense have agreed to a 10-year price floor of $110/kg for NdPr—a critical magnet rare earth—and significant government co-investment to expand U.S. downstream processing capabilities. This is not just industrial policy; it’s strategic economic security. For years, China has played a dominant role in the refining and downstream processing of rare earths and other critical minerals. These are small, niche commodity markets—easily destabilized by oversupply and pricing volatility. The risk? Western producers cannot scale or sustain operations without confidence in long-term price stability. This partnership marks a turning point: It de-risks long-term capital investment in domestic processing It aligns public and private interests in securing resilient supply chains And it sets a precedent for how the U.S. and its allies can compete in markets where pure price competition is not enough Governments don’t need to pick winners—but they do need to set the rules that allow strategic sectors to win. This is a model to watch. And, I believe, one to replicate across other critical minerals and across the Atlantic. https://lnkd.in/gyD99WaA #CriticalMinerals #RareEarths #MPMaterials #SupplyChainSecurity #PriceFloors #PublicPrivatePartnership #IndustrialPolicy #Geopolitics #ResilientSupplyChains #NdPr #MagnetMetals #ElementalUSA

Canada Is Now Buying Mining Stakes and It Signals a Global Shift Canada’s decision to take direct equity positions in mining and processing projects is not just an industrial policy it’s a geopolitical pivot. When one country (China) controls 70–90% of global processing capacity for critical minerals like terbium, dysprosium, graphite and lithium, securing supply becomes a matter of national security, not economics. That’s why Ottawa is now. Taking equity stakes in rare-earth and graphite projects Fast-tracking mines deemed national interest Launching a C$2 billion critical minerals sovereign fund Beginning stockpiling programs for scandium, graphite and more Mapping supply deficits to reduce dependence on China Meanwhile, companies like Nouveau Monde and Canada Nickel are surging as investors realise the political tailwind behind North American resource independence. The bigger picture.i Western governments are finally acknowledging what the market has known for years control over critical minerals determines who controls the next generation of technology, defence and energy systems. And they’re now acting accordingly.

The State of Critical Minerals Report 2025 from the Payne Institute for Public Policy at Colorado School of Mines highlights that the real bottleneck in critical minerals isn’t mining, it’s processing and refining, where Chinese dominance is most acute. That exposure shows up fast: a supply shock in any one of 13 key minerals could cut U.S. wind and solar deployment by 25%+ At the same time, demand is accelerating beyond clean energy. Defense and AI are set to drive ~135% growth across key minerals over the next decade. The opportunity is hiding in plain sight: ✳️ The U.S. exports one-third of its copper demand as scrap, much of it to China, while domestic recycling could cover 40% of demand. ✳️ Recovering just 10% of mine byproducts could eliminate imports of 27 critical minerals. ✳️ For some minerals, the fix is surprisingly cheap, securing U.S. gallium supply could cost ~$15M/year. This isn’t a geology problem. It’s a markets, processing, and investment problem and one the U.S. can still solve. #CriticalMinerals #NationalSecurity #EnergyTransition #SupplyChains #Geopolitics #Technology #energy

China’s Countermove in the Chip War: What’s Next for the US? China has responded to recent US chip restrictions with export bans on key materials essential for semiconductors and batteries. This escalation raises critical questions: How can the US and its allies diversify their supply chains? What are the options to mitigate reliance on China’s critical mineral dominance? Earlier this year, I spoke with Gracelin Baskaran, PhD, Director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Her insights into the geopolitics of critical minerals are more relevant than ever: 🔹 China is not the only game in town. Resource-rich countries in Africa and South America present opportunities for advanced economies to establish new supply chain partnerships. 🔹 Collaborate globally. Countries with capital to deploy, like Saudi Arabia, can be key allies in securing stable mineral supplies. The geopolitics of critical minerals will shape the future of technology and energy transitions. Let’s explore the solutions together. 🎙️ Watch or listen to the full conversation: 📺 YouTube: https://lnkd.in/gAYCP4J8 🎧 Apple: https://lnkd.in/gzybkbuK 🎧 Spotify: https://lnkd.in/gJW2vZ2t 💬 Join the conversation: What strategies do you think the US should prioritize in this critical minerals race? Or, how can we lower the temperature to keep markets open? #Geopolitics #CriticalMinerals #SupplyChain #China #USPolicy #Semiconductors #EnergyTransition #Batteries #Mining #Africa #SouthAmerica #Sustainability #Innovation #GlobalEconomy #NewEnlightenmentPodcast Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Adam Smith's Panmure House

Recorded Future has released a new Executive Insights Report that examines the intersection of critical minerals, geopolitical competition, and cyber operations, and how resource dependencies are quietly reshaping the threat landscape. Please read and share with your networks! Critical minerals are often framed as a supply chain issue. They are better understood as a control point. The concentration of refining capacity, particularly in China, has created a form of structural leverage that extends far beyond economics into diplomacy, defense, and technological development. Access to these materials increasingly determines not just industrial output, but strategic autonomy. What is changing is how that competition is being contested. Cyber operations are becoming an embedded feature of resource strategy. Intrusions into mining companies, regulators, and supply chain intermediaries are not isolated incidents. They map closely to national priorities, investment patterns, and emerging extraction frontiers. Intelligence collection, competitive positioning, and preemptive disruption are converging in ways that blur the line between espionage and market shaping. The geography of this competition is also shifting. As extraction expands into the Arctic, deep sea, and eventually space, the governance frameworks that traditionally constrain state behavior become less settled. These environments are capital intensive, politically sensitive, and operationally complex. That combination creates incentives to use cyber access not just to steal information, but to influence outcomes before they materialize in physical infrastructure or contractual agreements. There is a quieter dynamic underpinning all of this. Criminal activity targeting the mining sector is increasingly difficult to separate from state intent. Ransomware, data theft, and access brokerage can function as both revenue generation and strategic enablement. This dual-use model complicates attribution and raises the possibility that what appears opportunistic may, in certain contexts, be directionally aligned with national objectives. This reframes how critical infrastructure risk is assessed. The vulnerability is not only in extraction or transport, but in the informational layer that shapes investment decisions, regulatory positioning, and competitive outcomes. As dependence on these materials deepens, so does the incentive to shape the environment in which they are produced. The result is a form of competition where influence over supply chains begins well before a mine is built and persists long after materials enter global markets. Cyber operations are becoming one of the primary instruments used to achieve that influence.